Norfolk Southern Locomotive Engineer Training Handbook

1. Nj Locomotive Engineer Training Program
2. Locomotive Engineer Salaries
3. Norfolk Southern Locomotives For Sale

Start Preamble Start Printed Page 60372 AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. SUMMARY: Human factors are the leading cause of train accidents, accounting for 38 percent of the total in 2005. Human factors also contribute to employee injuries. The proposed rule would establish greater accountability on the part of railroad management for administration of railroad programs of operational tests and inspections, and greater accountability on the part of railroad supervisors and employees for compliance with those railroad operating rules that are responsible for approximately half of the train accidents related to human factors. Furthermore, this rulemaking is intended to supplant the need for Emergency Order 24, which requires special handling, instruction and testing of railroad operating rules pertaining to hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory.

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DATES: Written comments must be received by December 11, 2006. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense or delay. FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a public, oral hearing prior to November 13, 2006, one will be scheduled and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such hearing. ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA 2006-25267, may be submitted by any of the following methods:.

Web site:. Follow the instructions for submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site. Fax: 202-493-2251. Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-001. Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to. Follow the online instructions for submitting comments. Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking.

Note that all comments received will be posted without change to including any personal information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted comments or materials.

Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to at any time or to PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays. Start Further Info FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director, Operating Practices Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6255); or Alan H. Nagler, Senior Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., RCC-11, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6038).

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End Further Info End Preamble Start Supplemental Information SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents for Supplementary Information I. Background and Authority II.

Proceedings to Date A. Increase in Human Factor Caused Accidents and Non-compliance B. Accident at Graniteville, SC and Safety Advisory 2005-01 C.

Emergency Order No. FRA's Action Plan For Addressing Critical Railroad Safety Issues E. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview F.

Establishment of Railroad Operating Rules Working Group G. Development of the NPRM III.

Remote Control Operations A. Background B.

Situational Awareness C. Technology Aided Point Protection IV. Section-by-Section Analysis V.

Regulatory Impact and Notices A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and C. Paperwork Reduction Act D. Federalism Implications E. Environmental Impact F.

Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 G. Energy Impact H. Privacy Act VI. List of Subjects I. Background and Authority The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, as codified at, provides that, “the Secretary of Transportation, as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety supplementing laws and regulations in effect on October 16, 1970”. The Secretary's responsibility under this provision and the balance of the railroad safety laws have been delegated to the Federal Railroad Administrator. In the field of operating rules and practices, FRA has traditionally pursued a very conservative course of regulation, relying upon the industry to implement suitable railroad operating rules and mandating in the broadest of ways that employees be “instructed” in their requirements and that railroads create and administer programs of operational tests and inspections to verify rules compliance.

This approach was based on several factors, including a recognition of the strong interest the railroads have in avoiding costly accidents and personal injuries, the limited resources available to FRA to directly enforce railroad operating rules, and the apparent success of management and employees in accomplishing most work in a safe manner. Over the years, however, it became necessary to “Federalize” certain requirements, either to remedy perceived shortcomings in the railroads' rules or to emphasize the importance of compliance and to provide FRA a more direct means of promoting compliance.

These actions, which in most cases were preceded or followed by statutory mandates, included adoption of rules governing—. Blue Signal Protection for employees working on, under or between railroad rolling stock (, subpart B);. Railroad Communications ;. Prohibition of Tampering with Safety Devices (, subpart D); and. Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations ; In addition, FRA has adopted requirements for Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers that directly prohibit contravention of certain specified operating rules and practices. Start Printed Page 60373 FRA believes these programs of regulation contribute positively to railroad safety, in part because they contribute significantly to good discipline among affected employees.

FRA is not specifically required by statute to issue a regulation on the subjects covered by this proposed rule. However, FRA believes that establishing greater accountability for implementation of sound operating rules is necessary for safety. FRA is initiating this rulemaking because it has recognized that human factor train accidents comprise the largest single category of train accident causes and because existing regulations have proven inadequate to achieve a significant further reduction in their numbers or severity. Moreover, the current situation in the railroad industry, which is characterized by strong market demand, extensive hiring of new employees, and rapid attrition of older employees now becoming eligible for retirement, demands a more substantial framework of regulations to help ensure that operational necessity will not overwhelm systems of safeguards relied upon to maintain good discipline. The theme of this proposed rule is accountability. It embodies both a broad strategy intended to promote better administration of railroad programs, on the one hand, and a highly targeted strategy designed to improve compliance with railroad operating rules addressing three critical subject matters, on the other. Within this framework, FRA would take responsibility to set out certain requirements heretofore left to private action and for monitoring compliance with those requirements through appropriate inspections and audits.

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Railroad management would be more accountable for putting in place appropriate rules, instructions, and programs of operational tests. Railroad supervisors would be accountable for doing their part to administer operational tests and establish appropriate expectations with respect to rules compliance. Railroad employees would be accountable for complying with specified operating rules, and they would enjoy a right of challenge should they be instructed to take actions that, in good faith, they believe would violate the rules.

It is intended that this framework of accountability promote good discipline, prevent train accidents, and reduce serious injuries to railroad employees. In this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section, FRA provides a detailed explanation of the growing number of accidents, the severity of some of those accidents, the agency's prior actions, the approach proposed and some discussion of alternatives.

In certain instances, FRA specifically requests commenters to offer suggestions or provide information for FRA's consideration prior to a final rule. Of course, FRA would appreciate comments on any aspect of this proposed rule.

Proceedings to Date A. Increase in Human Factor Caused Accidents and Non-compliance FRA has grown steadily more concerned over the past few years as the frequency of human factor caused accidents has increased. When these accidents are reported, the reporting railroad is required to cite the causes of the accident. In the case of a human factor caused accident, an employee or employees are typically associated with a failure to abide by one or more railroad operating rules. Over the past few years, FRA inspectors have simultaneously observed a substantial increase in non-compliance with those railroad operating rules that are frequently cited as the primary or secondary causes to these types of accidents. Accidents caused by mishandling of equipment, switches and derails rose from 370 to 640 per year from the years 1997 to 2004—an increase of 42 percent. The greatest causes of these accidents as identified by the railroads were (1) switch improperly lined and (2) absence of employee on, at or ahead of a shoving movement.

These two issues alone account for over 60 percent of all accidents caused annually by employees mishandling of equipment, switches and derails. A grouping of four other causes saw steady increases from 133 per year in 1997 to 213 per year in 2004—a cumulative increase of 37 percent; these causes are (1) failure to control a shoving movement, (2) switch previously run through, (3) cars left foul and (4) failure to apply or remove a derail. Two additional causes of accidents, (1) switch not latched or locked and (2) car(s) shoved out and left out of clear, were the cited cause of only 10 accidents in 1997 and 40 accidents in 2004. While the accident data shows significant increases in these areas, the data collected by FRA during inspections suggests that the number of accidents could easily increase at an even greater rate.

FRA inspection data shows that non-compliance related to mishandling of equipment, switches and derails rose from 319 to 2,954 per year from the years 2000 to 2004—a nine-fold increase. The most common areas of human factor non-compliance were (1) employee failed to observe switch points for obstruction before throwing switch; (2) employee failed to ensure all switches involved with a movement were properly lined; (3) employee failed to ensure switches were latched or locked; (4) employee failed to ensure switches were properly lined before movement began; and (5) employee left equipment fouling adjacent track. Several other related issues of non-compliance also saw substantial increases, although the overall number of incidents found by FRA was lower than the top five. These additional areas of non-compliance are: (1) Employee left derail improperly lined (on or off); (2) absence of employee on, at, or ahead of shoving movement; (3) employee failed to ensure train or engine was stopped in the clear; (4) employee failed to ensure switches were properly lined after being used; (5) employee failed to reapply hasp before making move over switch (if equipped); (6) employee failed to relock the switch after use; and (7) one or more employees failed to position themselves so that they could constantly look in the direction of movement.

Some non-compliance data applies particularly to human factor mistakes FRA noted during inspections of operations involving remotely controlled locomotives. FRA assigned non-compliance codes to identify the following problems specifically associated with these remote control operations: (1) Employee operated equipment while out of operator's range of vision; (2) employee failed to provide point protection, locomotive leading; and (3) employee failed to provide point protection, car leading. In 2004, the first year that FRA collected data under those codes, FRA inspectors recorded 29 instances of non-compliance with the railroad's operating rules underlying the three codes. In 2005, the number of instances of non-compliance with those same codes recorded by FRA inspectors increased to 92. Accident at Graniteville, SC and Safety Advisory 2005-01 Although the increasing number of human factor caused accidents impacted the railroad industry and its employees, a catastrophic accident that occurred at Graniteville, South Carolina on January 6, 2005, catapulted the issue into the national spotlight.

As the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) described in its report NTSB/RAR-05/04, PB2005-916304 (Nov. 29, 2005), that accident occurred when Norfolk Southern Railway Company Start Printed Page 60374(NS) freight train 192, while traveling in non-signaled territory at about 47 miles per hour (mph), encountered an improperly lined switch that diverted the train from the main track onto an industry track, where it struck an unoccupied, parked train (NS train P22). The collision derailed both locomotives and 16 of the 42 freight cars of train 192, as well as the locomotive and 1 of the 2 cars of train P22. Among the derailed cars from train 192 were three tank cars containing chlorine, one of which was breached, releasing chlorine gas.

The train engineer and eight other people died as a result of chlorine gas inhalation. About 554 people complaining of respiratory difficulties were taken to local hospitals.

Of these, 75 were admitted for treatment. Because of the chlorine release, about 5,400 people within a 1-mile radius of the derailment site were evacuated for several days. Total property damages exceeded $6.9 million. The total monetized damages were much higher than that, with one estimate ranging as high as $125 million. NTSB determined that the probable cause of the collision was the failure of the crew of NS train P22 to return a main track switch to the normal position after the crew completed work at an industry. The crew's failure violated railroad operating rules but did not violate any Federal requirement. NS Operating Rule 104, in effect at the time, placed primary responsibility with the employee handling the switch and other crewmembers were secondarily responsible if they were in place to observe the switch's position.

NTSB/RAR-05/04 at 8. In addition, NTSB concluded that NS rules required a job briefing which “would likely have included a discussion of the switches and specifically who was responsible for ensuring that they were properly positioned and that had such a briefing taken place, the relining of the switch might not have been overlooked.” Id. FRA concurs that the lack of intra-crew communication regarding the switch's position was particularly significant at the time the crew was preparing to leave the site. Four days after the Graniteville accident (and coincidentally, two days after a similar accident at Bieber, California with serious, but not catastrophic consequences), FRA responded by issuing Safety Advisory 2005-01, “Position of Switches in Non-Signaled Territory.” (Jan. The issuance of a safety advisory is an opportunity for the agency to inform the industry and the general public regarding a safety issue, to articulate agency policy, and to make recommendations. FRA explained in the safety advisory that “a review of FRA's accident/incident data shows that, overall, the safety of rail transportation continues to improve.

However, FRA has particular concern that recent accidents on Class I railroads in non-signaled territory were caused, or apparently caused, by the failure of railroad employees to return manual (hand-operated) main track switches to their normal position, i.e., usually lined for the main track, after use. As a result, rather than continuing their intended movement on the main track, trains approaching these switches in a facing-point direction were unexpectedly diverted from the main track onto the diverging route, and consequently derailed.” Safety Advisory 2005-1 strongly urged all railroads to immediately adopt and comply with five recommendations that were intended to strengthen, clarify and re-emphasize railroad operating rules so as to ensure that all main track switches are returned to their normal position after use.

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The recommendations emphasized communication both with the dispatcher and other crewmembers. FRA recommended that crewmembers complete and sign a railroad-created Switch Position Awareness Form (SPAF). Proper completion of a SPAF was expected to trigger specific communication relevant to critical elements of the tasks to be performed. Additional training and railroad oversight were also recommended. Emergency Order No.

24 Safety Advisory 2005-1 did not have the long-term effect that FRA hoped it would. The Safety Advisory was intended to allow the industry itself a chance to clamp down on the frequency and severity of one subset of human factor accidents, i.e., those accidents involving hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory. FRA credits the Safety Advisory with contributing to a nearly six-month respite from this type of accident, from January 12 through July 6, 2005, but following this respite there was a sharp increase in serious accidents. Three serious accidents over a 28-day period were the catalyst for FRA issuing an emergency order: Emergency Order No. 24 (EO 24); Docket No. FRA-2005-22796, Notice 1, 61498 (Oct. The three accidents cited in EO 24 resulted in fatal injuries to one railroad employee, non-fatal injuries to eight railroad employees, an evacuation of civilians, and railroad property damage of approximately two million dollars.

Furthermore, each of these accidents could have been far worse, as each had the potential for additional deaths, injuries, property damage or environmental damage. Two of the accidents could have involved catastrophic releases of hazardous materials as these materials were present in at least one of the train consists that collided.

FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where an unsafe condition or practice “causes an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or personal injury.”. These orders may immediately impose “restrictions and prohibitions. that may be necessary to abate the situation.” Id. EO 24 was necessary because FRA could not secure compliance with these important railroad operating rules without additional action. FRA considered issuing another Safety Advisory, but that might at best only provide another temporary respite. The issuance of EO 24 was “intended to accomplish what the Safety Advisory could not: Implement safety practices that will abate the emergency until FRA can complete rulemaking”. 70 FR at 61498.

FRA further concluded that “reliance solely on employee compliance with railroad operating rules related to the operation of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, without a Federal enforcement mechanism, is inadequate to protect the public safety.” 70 FR at 61499. Thus, EO 24 supplied FRA with such an enforcement mechanism without the delay that is usually incurred through rulemaking. EO 24 is built on the foundation of FRA's regulations, at, which requires each railroad to instruct its employees on the meaning and application of its code of operating rules, and to periodically test its employees to determine their level of compliance.

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